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Philosophical Phantasms: ‘The Platonic Differential’ and ‘Zarathustra’s Laughter’  
Mischa Twitchin 
 
What changes in our understanding of ‘theatre’ if it is qualified as ‘philosophical’? That is, 
when theatre is addressed not in terms of its own historical practices – as, for example, 
literary or visual; dramatic or ‘post-’; actors’ theatre or directors’ theatre; immersive or even 
invisible – but as something conceptual? Besides the recycling of metaphors, when Foucault 
reviews Gilles Deleuze’s two major works of 1969 – The Logic of Sense and Difference and 
Repetition – under the title of ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’,1 how does either term distinguish 
the other; not least, with respect to the history of practices and personae which it names for 
itself? Following the Latin idiom of Foucault’s title, perhaps the most obvious distinction 
here would not be between the terms (theatre and philosophy) themselves, but rather with the 
metaphorics of the Theatrum mundi, that ‘world’ (or, in its changing meanings, ‘globe’) with 
which we think ourselves familiar. 
The Platonic relation of philosophy to the world – one of abstinence, asceticism, 
abstraction (even in Socrates’ or Seneca’s exemplary deaths) – was famously overthrown by 
Friedrich Nietzsche, just as perhaps he himself was overthrown in Turin, 3 January 1889. In 
Maurice Blanchot’s wonderful evocation: ‘We see Nietzsche collapse at the point where 
Dionysus, the pagan revelation of the divine, collides in him against the affirmation of the 
Crucified’.2 Here the traditional sense of philosophy as a preparation for death, the thoughtful 
consolation for mortality, implies that the world is its double, where death is a proof of 
immanence, not a realisation of transcendence. The Theatrum mundi is thus displaced by the 
 220 
sense of theatre as an exemplary trope (albeit disavowed) of philosophy’s relation to itself as 
a Theatrum philosophicum. This sets the scene, when thinking with Foucault, of a 
phantasmaphysics displacing metaphysics. 
 
Especially in the work of mourning, the testimony of friendship is a significant aspect 
of the history of philosophy. Addressing the concerns of this article, for example, Deleuze’s 
little book on Foucault3 offers a condensed reflection on a yearlong seminar (1985-86) 
devoted to what Foucault has still to say to us after his death.4 Although the focus here is, 
indeed, on Foucault and Deleuze, with their shared discussion of Nietzsche, it is also 
important to remember that this is a Nietzsche presented in the work of Pierre Klossowski. 
Arguably, the exemplary ‘philosophical theatre’ in Foucault’s reading is that of Klossowski’s 
novel Diana at her Bath and we may note again the tragic scene of Nietzsche’s collapse in 
Foucault’s short essay on the ‘prose of Acteon’ (1964), evoking ‘the Nietzschean interplay of 
Dionysus and Christ (since they are each, as Nietzsche saw, a simulacrum of the other)’.5 
Similarly, Acteon’s dream of possession of Diana becomes his own death, distinct from that 
familiarity – or identification even – with thought that is the legacy of Descartes. Here 
philosophical theatre becomes a play of phantasms emanating from the death mask of 
thought.6  
When Plato cites an analogy that was already ancient when he used it in the Philebus 
(47D-50E) – discussing (or, rather, disdaining) the everyday mixture of pleasure and pain in 
the soul – it is clear that neither the comic nor the tragic mask becomes philosophy. For Plato, 
philosophy should be the purification of such affects as anger, envy, and jealousy, which 
provide the principal motives of both life and drama. Transposing the former into the latter – 
the apparent arbitrariness of emotion into the ideal type of ‘character’ – Aristotle identifies 
plot as a technique for the purifying of such affects through catharsis. In the name of a 
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poetics, he sought thereby to save theatre for philosophy. Paradoxically, as discussion 
remains caught in continued reference to the ancients, it often seems that translations of Plato 
appear more contemporary than those of writers historically closer to us. While the 
implications of Nietzsche’s drawing parody out of tragedy,7 for instance, marks a modern 
resetting of the theatrical question for philosophy, it remains common place – especially in 
obituaries – to ascribe an ‘exemplary’ genre (whether tragic or comic) not only to the events 
of a person’s life, but to that life itself. Here the question remains as to how the difference 
between the Theatrum mundi and the Theatrum philosophicum is conceived of by either, not 
least in defining the other. 
Symptomatic of new fault lines in the historical stratification of society, Renaissance 
humanists, when addressing the ambiguities of the passions, would admit a hybrid genre as 
more appropriate to the human condition: dramatizing the tragi-comedy of life. Here, for 
example, Montaigne proposes: ‘For while it is true that most of our actions are but mask and 
cosmetic, and that it is sometimes true that Hœredis fletus sub persona risus est [Behind the 
mask, the tears of an heir are laughter], nevertheless we ought to consider when judging such 
events how our souls are often shaken by conflicting emotions’.8 It is in this sense of a 
‘conflicting’ genre (as, precisely, one of the so-called ‘problem’ plays) that Shakespeare 
offers us the example, in Measure for Measure, of such judgement in the characters of 
Angelo and Isabella (in contrast, for instance, to Tarquin and Lucretia). With Shakespeare we 
enter, as spectators, the very Globe, passing beneath the motto of its theatre: Totus mundus 
agit histrionem – ‘All the world’s a stage/ And all the men and women merely players’, as it 
is so famously glossed in As You Like It. If such a theatre is not philosophical (at least, in 
Platonic terms), does Foucault’s twentieth century evocation suggest, then, something 
necessarily anti-Platonic? And what might be the consequences for thinking through the 
difference – literally more Greek than Latin – between the theatrical and the philosophical? 
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Here we are engaged with a paradox. For the humanist world of theatrical analogy, 
with its metaphysically grounded ethical concerns with relations between face and mask, 
nature and artifice, itself conforms to a Platonic dramaturgy. This mundane theatre adheres to 
an interpretative metaphysics that distinguishes between reality and appearance, as if between 
truth (the honest character) and lie (the dissembling character). It even relegates to a 
derivative interest its own reproduction of appearances in terms of masks and actors, as if 
adopting for itself the traditional philosophical denigration of such role play as simulacra or 
phantasms. Indeed, the dramatic canon is full of plays that make this their very subject, 
whether in the name of ‘dreams’ or the ‘absurd’. For all that modernists tried to revalue this 
scenario in terms of professional training (as if an art or technique would save acting from 
‘mere’ artifice), from the point of view of the philosophical guardians the theatre-going hoi 
polloi remain as happy to mistake reality for fiction as fiction for reality. 
Resisting the lures of resemblance that would have us refer understanding back to 
originary models or meanings, Foucault indeed calls theatre ‘philosophical’ in an anti-
Platonic sense. What we might think is meant by ‘theatrical’ in the everyday is displaced 
conceptually as, precisely, a matter – or, rather, an event – of thinking; indeed, by its avowed 
dis-simulation as philosophy. ‘If the role of thought’, Foucault writes, ‘is to produce the 
phantasm theatrically and to repeat the universal event in its extreme point of singularity, 
then what is thought itself if not the event that befalls the phantasm and the phantasmatic 
repetition of the absent event?’9 In Foucault’s echo of Descartes’s larvatus prodeo, the 
philosopher here goes out into the world wearing a mask. 
Understood in the specifically modern sense of what, after Nietzsche (following 
Heidegger’s reading), is called the ‘reversal of Platonism’,10 the mask is now conceived of as 
‘freed from the constraints of similitude’.11 As both Foucault and Deleuze note, this ‘reversal’ 
is, however, already Platonic in its very inception; at least, when considering the example of 
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Plato’s own difficulty in saving Socrates from the sophists. ‘What philosophy has not tried to 
overturn Platonism? If we defined philosophy at the limit as any attempt, regardless of its 
source, to reverse Platonism then philosophy […] begins with Plato himself, with the 
conclusion of the Sophist where it is impossible to distinguish Socrates from the crafty 
imitators’.12 It is this paradoxical recognition that provides what Foucault calls a ‘Platonic 
differential’,13 as an index of the return of Platonism within what is opposed to it. 
Contemporaneously, Deleuze even offers an example of this ‘reversal’ as ‘dramatization’,14 
when making a parallel with the sense of differentiation (distinct from dialectics) – where the 
question of philosophy is understood, in its Nietzschean transformation, as a question for 
philosophy. ‘Given any concept’, Deleuze proposes, ‘we can always discover its drama’ as 
soon as the question is no longer ‘what is the true?’ but ‘who wants the true?’15 
Before returning to the ‘theatre’ (or ‘drama’) of this philosophy, we might also recall 
its relation to art history. Perhaps the most familiar example of the mask of difference (as an 
appearance of indifference) comes from Pop art, with which Foucault’s ‘philosophical 
theatre’ was historically contemporary. Andy Warhol (for all his Catholic piety) famously 
provides us with a silk-screened veronica of this emancipated mask, not least in the guise of a 
self-portrait: ‘If you want to know all about Andy Warhol, just look at the surfaces of my 
paintings and films and me, and there I am. There is nothing behind it’.16 Needless to say, for 
each Warhol candle there are many more fifteen-minute artist-moths. Here one might also 
reflect on the co-creation of sculpture and spectator entailed by Robert Morris’s Untitled 
(Mirrored Cubes), first presented in 1965 (of which Tate Modern has a sanctioned ‘remake’, 
1976).17 The edifying ‘presence’ of art shows its apparent subject quartered into a mirrored 
abyme that is, precisely, all surface and no depth. Famously, art and theatre here become the 
simulacrum of performance; not least, in the latter’s phantasy of ‘presence’. 
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But if the reverse-Platonic performance art of the 1960s concerns the ‘mask of these 
masks’,18 what kind of mask or persona might become the ‘worldly’ philosopher – 
traditionally distinct from both artist and actor (Nietzsche notwithstanding) – as a figure of 
and for their ‘voice’? Is it possible to ‘translate’ the philosopher, as with the great Ass’s Head 
of worldly theatre, without the measure of a Platonic differential? As no longer an Angel to a 
Faery Queen or a Bottom to mere mortals, for example? What relation might now hold 
between a gay science and a philosophical theatre; or a symposium and an asses’ festival 
(with Zarathustra’s laughter at men who would be gods)?19 Foucault’s own answer was to 
advocate the mask of anonymity, taking the question ‘who?’ (rather than ‘what?’) and 
replying – with Beckett – by proposing this as ‘one of the fundamental ethical principles of 
contemporary writing’.20 
In Foucault’s phantom theatre, the many deaths of Plato are ritually enacted by the 
philosophers in a pantomime of repetition, like a parody of Julius Caesar, beginning (as 
already noted) with Plato himself in the attempt to decide between the mask of Socrates and 
the Sophist. The cast also includes Duns Scotus – who appears ‘sporting an impressive 
moustache […] belong[ing] to Nietzsche, disguised as Klossowski’.21 Indeed, amongst 
Foucault’s philosophical personae, it is this particular disguise that provides a synopsis of all 
that came before in the understanding of what follows. The epilogue, meanwhile, is provided 
by Deleuze’s staging of Nietzsche’s ‘reversal of Plato’ (in the translation by Klossowski). 
This is not simply ‘untimely’ in its question of modernity, but becomes a question of which 
century we, the spectators of this ‘world’, might imagine ourselves to be living in, whether as 
this concerns nihilism or ‘progress’.  
For all the continuing academic industry of Deleuze studies, certain aspects of his 
century have, perhaps, proved rather short lived, especially when mistaken for something that 
used to be called ‘post-modern’ – distinct from the enduring anachronism of its past futures. 
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Nonetheless, what Foucault – in his thinking ‘theatrically’ – suggests ‘most urgently needs 
thought in this century’22 is not just in and of its own time. In ‘this’ century (the Deleuzian 
one), Foucault writes: ‘The philosophy of representation – of the original, the first time, 
resemblance, imitation, faithfulness – is dissolving; and the arrow of the simulacrum [or 
phantasm] released by the Epicureans is headed in our direction. It gives birth – rebirth – to a 
“phantasmaphysics”’.23 In terms of a concern that is recurrent in Deleuze, this involves a 
philosophical search for a ‘new image of the act of thought, its functioning, its genesis in 
thought itself’.24 
Does ‘phantasmaphysics’ – as a generator of images of and for the act of thinking (as 
its ‘theatre’) – undo the Platonic differential of metaphysics? Does it, thereby, transform the 
sense of a philosophical ‘theatre’ after Nietzsche? Is ‘phantasmaphysics’ an atavism of the 
‘pre-philosophical’, like the ‘primitivism’ that is amongst the proudest inventions of 
modernism? Is it an echo of that return of tragedy, of Dionysus contra Socrates, explored by 
different participants in the College of Sociology? Is there, perhaps, an echo of philosophical 
laughter in this old-new knowledge (or ‘science’) of phantasms, at least in its difference from 
phenomenology? 
The repressed of metaphysics has taken many names, so that now ‘phantasmaphysics’ 
itself seems to have as little recognition as its near homonym, ‘pataphysics’. The knowledge 
of phantasms (in both senses of the genitive) becomes here a question of appearances no 
longer defined by an opposition to truth. Amongst the emblematic statements of this, we 
might recall Nietzsche’s artful appeal to lived (rather than transcendental) experience: ‘We no 
longer believe that truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn; we have lived too much 
to believe this’.25 And it is, precisely, the Gay Science (with the posthumously published 
notes, following Colli and Montinari’s text) that, in 1967, Deleuze and Foucault together 
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presented – again in Klossowski’s translation – as the first volume of the new Gallimard 
edition of Nietzsche.26 
Whether the distinction between phenomenology and phantasmaphysics is itself more 
(or less) than apparent is another question, however; one that could well be explored through 
Deleuze’s philosophical parody, adducing Heidegger’s relation to Jarry.27 But, beyond the 
metaphysical guignol of the history of philosophy, the theatre of ‘phantasmaphysics’ is not 
simply a problem of and for understanding (or thinking) itself. It offers an orientation to help 
problematise much else that ‘needs thought in this century’ – in broaching, for instance, the 
decolonisation of such thinking. How might this philosophical theatre contribute to what 
Latour has called an ‘anthropology of the moderns’,28 for example, through an enquiry not 
only about – but with – the phantasms that possess modernity in its very denial of them? In 
this ‘theatre’, the ‘primitivism’ that was once thought to distinguish modernity from its Other 
has long been recognised as a distinction within modernity itself, as the effect of cracks in the 
mirror of its claimed ‘universality’. The theatre of phantasmaphysics offers manifold senses 
of ‘possession’ – and dispossession – that would be key to exploring worlds which modernity 
has sought to define in its own image (conceived through its Platonic differential rather than 
Zarathustra’s laughter). 
Between the philosophical and the theatrical (in the miming of the one by the other), 
we might then wonder how phantasms become personae; not least, when something in the 
voice invites a change in hearing. Whether in Turin or in Rodez, the potential of laughter – 
that scream of the enlightened – is not reducible to the genre masks of sacred tragedy or 
profane comedy. In the echo of laughter, if the metaphor of ‘unmasking’ is itself unmasked 
by phantasmaphysics, what might it mean to ‘face the truth’? What becomes of an all-too-
human face, with no divine model, in the claims of – and for – a modernity that is as 
murderous as it is emancipatory? 
 227 
In Zarathustra’s account, the pagan gods died laughing at the pretension of one 
amongst them who jealously proclaimed himself to be the only one;29 one who would later 
have to be killed by his worshippers, who would then look amongst themselves for the 
victims of a new holocaust. It is hard now to hear the echo of the gods’ laughter in the vertigo 
of masks, where those who have killed their (one) god no longer have any sense of sacrifice 
in common. In modernity, the sense of each as the other’s potential victim – in the image of a 
god – no longer bears any meaning of ‘purification’. Despite ‘this century’s’ appeal to a 
‘rebirth’ of phantasms, perhaps we remain afraid of not being able to distinguish the former 
gods from future madmen? This question is a red thread in the post-Nietzschean dramas of 
Stanislaw Witkiewicz, for instance; while the suspicion is now widespread as to whether the 
personae of a ‘post-Platonic’ theatre can offer any resistance to cynicism. 
In Deleuze’s attempt to save the eternal recurrence from the principle of the (Platonic) 
Same (to which difference is otherwise subordinated), what are the consequences (or, at least, 
the implications) of turning the question of theatre from that of imitation (or representation) 
to that of simulation (or masquerade) – as if metaphysics were, indeed, ‘overcome’? What is 
the temporality of this ‘reversal’, which offers an unmasking not of the face but of the mask 
itself? The figure of ‘reversal’, after all, no more means that modernity is ‘post-Platonic’ than 
that it is defined by anti-Platonism. Here one might substitute any number of actors in this 
‘theatre’, wearing the very masks of these same prefixes. Such instances of dramatization 
(and their recurrence) engage with the historically relative claims for what needs thinking: the 
post-colonial, for instance, as the desired consequence of anti-colonialism. If, then, the 
Platonic differential provides a diagnosis (which, in another philosophical register, could be 
called a ‘pharmacology’), perhaps the symptom of an impossible cure for metaphysics 
remains Zarathustra’s laughter? 
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Amongst the exemplary simulacra of and for Eurocentric, metaphysical reason is the 
‘fetish’ and its corollary theatre of possession by forces that rationality calls ‘primitive’. 
While we might think here of Artaud’s celebration of the Marx brothers,30 Peter Brook 
preferred, for his planned ‘theatre of cruelty’ season, to share with his company a film by 
Jean Rouch entitled Les Maîtres Fous (or The Master Madmen).32 This film has had a 
complex (and controversial) reception and one might wonder whether a phantasmaphysical 
theatre might allow us to think through this example without simply repeating its historical 
reception, as if it ‘unmasked’ the interest of the film. Of what then might the entangled 
reception of Rouch’s film be symptomatic, at least amongst its ‘Western’ audiences, 
including those in Niger where it was filmed? Whatever Rouch’s film may or may not tell us 
about the Hauka, whose cult of spirit possession it presents (commissioned, indeed, by two of 
its priests), what does its reception tell us about its European viewers – within a 
phantasmaphysical ethnography of ‘the moderns’? How do colonial phantasms appear in the 
neo-colonial metropolis, screened (literally) by the image of others; when, unlike the 1960s 
(the decade of Independence), the post – as in the post-colonial (or even the post-modern) – is 
no longer a promise of the future? Here we return to the question as to which century we 
might imagine ourselves to be living in ‘philosophically’ – surrounded by the phantasmata of 
our consumerist fetishism.  
In contrast to Foucault’s own example of LSD-induced ‘trance’ (like Pop Art, 
emblematic of its time),33 Rouch’s film focuses (as it were) on a theatre of transformation that 
profoundly interrupts modernist expectations of perception; especially where the face 
becomes its own mask, with bulging eyes and contorted mouth. Crucially, the West African 
Hauka cult adopted various European colonial officials into the spirit pantheon of traditional 
Songhay rituals of possession. Phantasmaphysics invites us to consider that such possession 
is not explained (still less purified or exorcised) simply in Platonic terms as a question of 
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model and imitation – as between the colonial figure (or image) and the colonised 
imagination (or body) – but invents new images of and for a historical understanding of 
modernity’s necropolitics.34 
While the temptation to speak of ceremonial mask and naked violence seems almost 
inevitable with respect to the colonisers themselves, does this not simply reproduce the 
metaphysical theatre that, in the colonial phantasy, would distinguish itself from a ‘pre-
modern’ atavism or ‘primitivism’ of possession? The difference between the metaphysical 
and phantasmaphysical might, indeed, appear to be that between acting and possession; as if 
the one projected a ‘model’ that the other introjected. But given that most theories of acting 
contradict this, it is perhaps the very structure of the opposition here that fails to account for 
the difference. This is precisely the conceptual scenario that Foucault’s philosophical theatre 
invites us ‘urgently’ to consider; even as the Platonic schema is perhaps implied in Rouch’s 
own commentary on the Hauka, which provides a pharmakon or theoretical ‘cure’ of the 
otherwise delirial impression of their practices.35 
Crucially, the point is not so much a cure of the dissociation manifested in the 
possession states but, precisely, a cure of dissociation by the possession states – as 
manifesting an integration of psychic disturbance with a social practice. Here the question of 
mimesis returns for a European philosophical theatre of ‘difference and repetition’, a review 
of which precisely provided the occasion for Foucault’s theatrum philosophicum. The 
possession by phantasms is a mode of mimesis that is not simply an identification, but a 
technique of acting with identification for which theatre offers an occidental metaphor. 
In Hausa the word hauka means crazy or mad;36 but here the question of translation is 
not simply of a word but the contexts through which its meaning – for whom? – is in 
question. It is a moot point, after all, whether this (anti-) Platonic ‘cure’ of and by 
phantasmatic possession serves for the Hauka themselves, who are seen in everyday life 
 230 
outside the confines of the colonial psychiatric hospital (not to mention the cinema, as in the 
contrasting example of Jean-Pierre Bekolo’s film, Aristotle’s Plot); or for the European 
viewers, who see no mastery only madness in the inverted image of their own identification 
with the phantasms of the screen, possessed by an atavism that they claim to know only in 
others.37 
Perhaps in terms of phantasmaphysics we could reflect other-wise on the 
consternation, if not the racist anxiety, with which Les Maîtres Fous has been typically 
viewed, with its ‘modern’ audience – who might also be spectators at the Globe, going to see 
actors embody that dreamwork of colonialism, The Tempest – unwilling, or unable, to relate 
to the Haukas’ colonial mimicry (at least as film), especially when it foams at the mouth. For 
the unsuspecting, this expression of the spirit possession appears as a kind of informel 
transgression of the ‘civilised’ demarcation of the cultural from the natural – a scenario (like 
the eating of dog meat) that refers itself to the conventions that constitute a taboo. But this 
excessive saliva is also an example of technique, just as with all aspects of possession and its 
‘visibility’.38 These masters of colonial madness, in their parody of Prince Philip as much as 
their exorcism of Mr Kurtz, mix both horror and humour, presenting a simulacrum of 
European colonial violence as coeval with its primitivist (capitalist) ‘reason’.39  
The Hauka demonstrate the contemporaneity of ‘tradition’, the continually developing 
meaning of the past in the present (through the chiasmic relation of the present in the past), 
where the phantasm is also a phantom, not reducible to an ‘anti-theatrical’ opposition 
between world and representation. In Paul Stoller’s research with the Hauka since the 1970s 
(in the decades after Independence), we seem to return to the question of ‘mixed genre’ in 
worldly theatre, when he calls their rituals of possession – as a mode of cultural resistance to 
European power in Niger – an ‘horrific comedy’.40 Again, what if this ‘horrific comedy’ were 
to be thought of in terms of a philosophical theatre? Rather than recalibrating a traditional 
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philosophical differential – between simulacrum and truth – what if our understanding did not 
try to curtail or contain the laughter (or the fear) which it mimetically incites? What if the 
question of a ‘mixed genre’ here concerned the senses rather than the poetics of plot? A 
haptic vision, a hearing eye, an unsettling of the separation between active and passive? How 
different this would be from the recuperation offered, for instance, by the wish to see in spirit 
possession something ‘authentic’ in relation to ‘alienated’ modernity, something ‘really real’ 
(as Mattijs van de Port describes it),41 which carries over into the curiously Platonic 
‘intensities’ of so much discussion of performance art? These paradoxes are particularly 
manifest when de Port discusses ‘the theatre metaphor’ in the example of Candomblé – 
reflecting on the incorporation of the tourist gaze into the circuit of authentication of what is 
‘inexplicable’ in the ceremonies.42 
Of course, the Hauka masquerade is not one that European museums choose to show 
when ‘animating’ their formalist displays of African masks – whether these are understood as 
ethnographic artefacts or as examples of ‘world art’. The Hauka are not recognised as part of 
the standard contextualisation in terms of performance for these museum encounters (or 
‘contact’) with what has been imagined in the ‘West’ as ‘pre-modern’. One might say that 
this reticence concerning phantasms is due to obvious reasons concerning the violence of 
their appearance. But how and why something is deemed to be ‘obvious’ – especially with 
respect to violence – may not itself be so obvious. The appearance of masks and the 
symbolisation of violence in critical examples of African cinema – for instance, the very 
different poetics of Sembène’s Moolaadé or Bekolo’s Aristotle’s Plot – is not part of this 
museum encounter either. African futures, as transforming European pasts, are again 
appropriated by these institutions’ new investment in contemporary art, as if the global art 
market offered answers to questions of museum anthropology that have ceased even to be 
asked. 
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With respect to the supposed evidence of film, modernity is so enthralled by the 
phantasms of the screen that image industries are now devoted to promoting ‘immersive 
experiences’ of commoditised vision, including within the so-called ‘interactive museum’. Is 
this not another global colonisation of imagination through the technology of ‘spirits’ and 
their exploitation of affect – now ‘purified’ simply in terms of reducing resistance to 
consumption? In the ‘war of dreams’,43 the sense that thinking about phantasmata involves a 
return of thinking with or through such phantasms – that, indeed, reflection on film or cinema 
might be oriented by what has still to be learnt from cultures of spirit possession, rather than 
simply by projection upon them – is, as Foucault said, ‘urgent’. 
Perhaps the vaunted digital emancipation of simulacra or phantasms – especially in 
terms of a commodified reality that wants to be called ‘augmented’, ‘immersive’, and (ad 
absurdum) ‘3-D’ – has not made the ancient theatrical metaphor of ‘the world’ 
philosophically redundant, after all. The digital economy, afraid of a reality that may yet limit 
its powers of exploitation, remains chained to what it still advertises as an experience of the 
‘real thing’. Here the possibility for thinking through relations between the colonial museum 
and global imaging technologies in phantasmaphysics broaches an anthropology of mediated 
consciousness beyond the old disciplinary walls. Exploring the manifold senses in which ‘we 
have never been modern’,44 Deleuze’s evocation (‘after’ Foucault) of ‘control societies’ 
reflects on an image of thought that could indeed be called a ‘philosophical theatre’. The 
subject of research would follow the shift (advanced by Deleuze and Foucault, after 
Nietzsche) from determining the ‘what’ of exhibitionary or curatorial power to questions of 
the ‘dramatization’ (or agency) differentiating that power. Such a research opens itself up to 
the possibilities of the phantasmatic, rather than simply the perceptual; to the dynamic, rather 
than simply the descriptive. 
 233 
Paradoxically perhaps, in less histrionic (or perhaps more stoical) terms, Foucault’s 
turn to a hermeneutics of the self, to an aesthetics or technique of the mask, suggests a more 
than superficial reading of philosophical survivals, including laughter. The authentic is not a 
return to origins but an ongoing invention, as the very artifice that is traditionally condemned 
as inauthentic and unoriginal. Whether in Eleusis or in Kreuzlingen, the question of truth is 
not what it appears; and here, perhaps, reference to Foucault’s ‘theatre’ of thought is not only 
historical but necessary. Between difference and repetition (or between mimesis and alterity), 
this philosophical theatre offers an interpretation of life and death quite distinct from the 
networked Fitbits that translate desires and anxieties into marketable data. This latest digital 
short-circuiting of reflection, with its inverted claims of ‘self-control’, contrasts with the 
corporeal interruption of reflection – or, indeed, its ‘possession’ – by the ‘eternal return’ of 
laughter. At stake in both is an understanding of mortality, which (as Foucault reminds us) 
the Stoics conceived of, in an art of philosophical performance, as a practice of individuation 
in correspondence with others.  
From the circle of Klossowski’s Nietzsche again, Blanchot too offers an example of 
this, in a reading of the phantasmaphysical play of the subject becoming its own 
differentiation: ‘[E]verything has still not been said definitely; for if the gods die laughing, it 
is no doubt because laughter is the movement of the divine, but also because it is the very 
space of dying – dying and laughing, laughing divinely and laughing mortally, laughter as 
Bacchic movement of the true and laughter as mockery of the infinite error passing 
incessantly into one another’.45 What may be said here is not said ‘“once and for all” but, 
rather, “yet again”’.46 And is it not such an art of spacing – that of dying and laughing, as that 
of writing and reading – that returns in Foucault’s own practice of critical research? That is, 
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